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3
Country-by-country Reporting
Richard Murphy
3.1 INTRODUCTION
It is now more than a decade since I ﬁrst proposed the idea of country-by-
country reporting by multinational corporations (Murphy, 2003). In essence
the idea is a simple one. All that country-by-country reporting demands is that
multinational corporations publish a proﬁt and loss account and limited
balance sheet and cash ﬂow information for every jurisdiction in which they
trade as part of their annual ﬁnancial statements. Though the idea is simple, it
has been the subject of much debate and not a little controversy since I ﬁrst
outlined it in 2003.
That process of debate has not, however, been fruitless. Country-by-country
reporting has made enormous strides in the last few years although, as yet, no
one is talking about delivery of the key idea of publishing audited separate
accounts for each jurisdiction in which a multinational corporation operates.
We have instead had statutory requirements in both the United States and
European Union (CCFD-Terre Solidaire, 2013) that companies in the extract-
ive industries (relating to oil, gas, mining and in the EU only, forestry) must
report the taxes that they pay and limited additional data for each country in
which they operate. In addition, the EU has now required (Directive 2013/36/
EU, Article 89) that banks publish data on a country-by-country basis for their
turnover, number of employees, proﬁt, tax paid, and any subsidies received.
Debate is now also taking place in the EU parliament on whether this
requirement should be extended to other companies in other sectors. And
perhaps most importantly of all, the G8 under the chairmanship of UK Prime
Minister David Cameron asked the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in June 2013 to consider whether multinational
corporations should report their proﬁts on a country-by-country basis to all
the tax authorities who might consider their affairs (G8 Leaders, 2013, para.
25). This has now been included for consideration by the OECD’s Base
Erosion and Proﬁt Shifting Programme (see Action 13 in OECD, 2013).
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As this chapter notes, all these developments under the country-by-country
reporting brand name (for that is what it now seems to be) are welcome.
However, the core demand has not been achieved. That is why the campaign
for full country-by-country reporting is continuing despite progress made
to date.
3 .2 THE ISSUE AND REFORM PROPOSAL
At the core of the demand for country-by-country reporting is a contention
that globalization is not working for the beneﬁt of everyone. Some nation
states and large parts of the world’s population have lost out as the power of
the global corporation has risen, including its power to not pay tax in the right
place at the right rate and at the right time. That has been obvious since 2008
and popular agitation since then has highlighted the scale of worldwide tax
avoidance by many of the most proﬁtable multinational corporations, leading
with Google.1 What is now also increasingly appreciated is that the model of
accounting put forward by the accountancy profession (International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards) exacerbated the ﬁnancial crisis that erupted in that
year in a number of ways.2
Most obviously, current accounting standards fail by treating multinational
corporations as if they operate in a homogenous global ether that ﬂoats above
the physical and human geography of the world. As a result they report just
one proﬁt or loss irrespective of where their money is earned and have only
one balance sheet wherever assets may be located. The ﬁnancial markets focus
exclusively on this consolidated balance sheet even though for a great many
reasons this is a completely incorrect view of the enterprise. As the events of
2008 clearly indicated, companies are unavoidably tied to real places. They
operate within national frameworks of law and regulation. What they do in
each place, what they report, and how they spread risks between different
locations—these are all of enormous signiﬁcance to the jurisdictions that host
their activities.3
Furthermore, all limited companies are granted a license to operate by each
and every country in which they trade. It is commonplace (but not universal)
for multinational companies to set up subsidiary companies for their oper-
ations in each country in which they work. That ring fences their risk in the
country in question, makes it easier to differentiate their tax liabilities between
territories and, of course, grants them limited liability within that jurisdiction.
1 See, for example, Drucker (2010). 2 See, for example, UK Parliament (2012a).
3 This concern is the foundation of the enquiries by the UK parliament’s Public Accounts
Committee into the activities of Google, Starbucks, and Amazon—see UK Parliament (2012b).
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The issue remains relevant even when they do not establish a formally
constituted subsidiary in a jurisdiction. In that case, country-by-country
reporting has the advantage of revealing trade in a jurisdiction that may
otherwise remain hidden from view. That is because it requires disclosure of
trades undertaken in jurisdictions through what are called “permanent estab-
lishments” that are, in effect branches of companies incorporated in another
place but which also enjoy limited liability as a result.
This privilege of limited liability is an extraordinary thing. It is enjoyed by
multinational corporations as a whole, but just as importantly it is usually also
enjoyed by the subsidiary companies they create in each and every jurisdiction
where they operate. This concept of limited liability within limited liability
appears to have evolved more by accident than by design, but the result of the
grant of that privilege by each of the jurisdictions in which a multinational
corporation works affords it enormous ﬁnancial reward. This beneﬁt arises
because a multinational’s cost of capital, for the entity as a whole and for each
of its subsidiaries, is substantially reduced by the availability of limited liability
to it and its subsidiary companies. It needs much less capital to trade than
would an individual or organization without limited liability. The enterprise as
a whole is not exposed to risks incurred by its subsidiaries. Societies around
the world explicitly accept that if for any reason a constituent of a multi-
national corporation ceases to trade then that company and the owners of its
capital will not have to make good the loss they have incurred. The risk of a
subsidiary’s collapse will instead be transferred to the state in which it traded
and the members of the community who traded with it in that place.
Most of the time this risk is ignored and the cost of the resulting failures is
contained within the business, banking, and investment communities of each
country as a part of the collective risk they take. However, as is very obvious
now, that is not always the case. Since 2008 large parts of the world’s banking
community, almost all of it protected by limited liability, has required massive
state bailouts at cost to the communities the world over. That process has yet
to end.
There is then a clear dichotomy: global ﬁnancial accounting ignores inter-
national borders because it says that the primary users of general purpose
ﬁnancial reporting are present and potential investors, lenders, and other
creditors of the company who use that information to make decisions about
buying, selling, or holding equity or debt instruments and providing or settling
loans or other forms of credit (Deloitte, 2010). There is no doubt that some of
these may primarily view the entity as a single global enterprise for the
purposes of their risk assessment at present and existing accounts are designed
to facilitate that process. On the other hand, the fact that they say they use
accounts in this way is not surprising; this information is the only data that
they have. If they had country-by-country data they may well use it; without
any experience of having it, the fact that they say they do not use it is not
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 8/10/2015, SPi
98 Richard Murphy
Comp. by: Jayapathirajan Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002617765 Date:8/10/15 Time:21:09:48
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002617765.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 99
evidence that they would not do so. This potential use is the ﬁrst reason for
providing country-by-country data, and its signiﬁcance should not be ignored.
Existing ﬁnancial reporting standards help senior management of many
companies hide from view much of what they do. Providing a more rounded
insight on those activities, which country-by-country reporting is bound to do,
has to be of beneﬁt to all those who represent the shareholder community.
Indeed, country-by-country reporting would, by providing data that is not
currently available, ensure that the providers of capital to companies enjoy a
view of the risks that they face that is currently unavailable. This data will also
allow participants in capital markets to better appraise the risks they accept
and if risk is better understood then the cost of capital for companies will be
reduced. That has an inevitable consequence, which is an increase in invest-
ment and so growth. As such, the call for country-by-country reporting is an
intensely pro-business demand.
This argument for country-by-country reporting does, however, ignore the
fact that there are many other stakeholders of the company, including the
authorities and populations of the many jurisdictions in which it trades, who
will also wish to appraise the risks that it creates for them locally. Enabling this
stakeholder process of ﬁnancial risk assessment is the second reason for
country-by-country reporting because it empowers those exposed to the
risks created by the subsidiaries of multinational operations to assess just
what those subsidiaries are doing. The various risks to which national juris-
dictions are exposed are outlined later in this paper.
One risk that stands out as needing assessment does, of course, relates to tax
paid and (as importantly) not paid both within a particular jurisdiction and
also within others where one jurisdiction thinks a multinational corporation
might be hiding proﬁts that it has the right to assess to tax. Country-by-
country reporting is particularly well suited to this task because, by demanding
data for each and every jurisdiction in which a multinational corporation
trades, it requires reporting for those jurisdictions where it is quite legal for
accounts to not be put on public record at present. Colloquially called tax
havens, but for the purpose of this analysis more accurately deﬁned as secrecy
jurisdictions,4 these places provide a double veil of secrecy for multinational
corporations. If the ﬁnancial statements of multinational corporations are
already deﬁcient in not requiring them to account for their activities locally
then secrecy jurisdictions exploit this fact by providing them with a deliber-
ately created environment where no local information is published, meaning
4 I deﬁne secrecy jurisdictions as places that intentionally create regulation for the primary
beneﬁt and use of those not resident in their geographical domain with that regulation being
designed to undermine the legislation or regulation of another jurisdiction and with the secrecy
jurisdictions also creating a deliberate, legally backed veil of secrecy that ensures that those from
outside the jurisdiction making use of its regulation cannot be identiﬁed to be doing so.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 8/10/2015, SPi
Country-by-country Reporting 99
Comp. by: Jayapathirajan Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002617765 Date:8/10/15 Time:21:09:49
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002617765.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 100
that certain parts of the multinational corporations activities can, at its choice,
entirely disappear from view, in the process destroying any form of account-
ability for its activity. Country-by-country reporting has been deliberately
designed to counter this opportunity for corporate secrecy.
All of this supports the reform proposal inherent in country-by-country
reporting, which is that multinational corporations publish within those
annual ﬁnancial statements a proﬁt and loss account and limited balance
sheet and cash ﬂow data for every jurisdiction in which the company trades,
without exception.
3 .3 WHAT IS COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING?
3.3.1 Why Do We Need Country-by-country Reporting?
We need country-by-country reporting for the reasons noted above, but we
especially need country-by-country reporting in a world in which there is a
crisis in collecting the tax that appears to be due by multinational corporations
because of the obvious deﬁciencies in current accounting practices for tax
purposes.
Current accounting practice makes it possible for multinational enterprises
to avoid tax due while obeying the letter of the law. This effective exemption
from tax enjoyed by a signiﬁcant chunk of the global economy has contributed
to a ﬁscal crisis. Vast corporate cash piles accumulate offshore as social
programs and infrastructure investments onshore are cancelled.
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is responsible for
the International Financial Reporting Standard, which are the most widely
spread accounting standards now used by multinational corporations. The
IASB are aware of this deﬁciency: they have stated that the ﬁnancial
statements created using its standards are not suitable for tax authority
use even if prepared for a single entity on a non consolidated basis (IFRS,
n.d.:15). The problems in using group accounts for tax purposes include the
following:
1. Those ﬁnancial statements do not necessarily include all the companies
that make up a group for tax purposes.
2. They do not disclose all the companies that are consolidated, or where
they are, or what they do.
3. They purposefully exclude from consideration and view all intra-group
transactions—which are precisely those that create transfer pricing risk.
4. They do not provide segment data that provides almost any useful
indication of the location of transactions for tax purposes.
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5. They do not necessarily reﬂect the transactions undertaken in the
underlying accounts disclosed to the individual tax authorities dealing
with the affairs of the individual companies that make up the group
entity. That is because of the impact of what are called group consoli-
dation journals that remove from account, without it being apparent,
those intra-group proﬁts arising, for example, from different accounting
standards being used in different group companies. It is precisely this
type of transaction about which tax authorities require information.
Country-by-country reporting was designed to address these deﬁciencies in
existing accounting reporting when used for tax purposes. So far there is no
alternative proposal that seeks to address these deﬁciencies in reporting for
this purpose.
3.3.2 Country-by-country Reporting Is Designed for Use
by All Multinational Corporations
Country-by-country reporting was always designed to be accounting disclos-
ure applying to all multinational corporations, whatever the sector they
worked in. That is because the problems it addresses are universal and apply
to all sectors. It is stressed that country-by-country reporting is not an
initiative for the extractive industries or banking alone. And nor is this an
issue relating solely to tax payment or eliminating corruption, important as
those issues are. Country-by-country reporting is about an integrated form of
ﬁnancial reporting that should be part of the ﬁnancial statements of a multi-
national corporation.
3.3.3 The Questions Country-by-country Reporting
Is Designed to Answer
Country-by-country reporting was speciﬁcally designed to answer questions
on the following issues:
a. In which countries does a multinational company operate?
b. What are the subsidiaries of each multinational corporation called in
each jurisdiction in which it operates?
c. What is the scale of a multinational corporation’s operations in each
country in which it operates?
d. How much does a multinational corporation have invested in each place
where it trades?
e. Where does a multinational corporation record its proﬁts?
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f. Where does a multinational corporation pay tax and how much does it
pay there?
g. What is the extent of intra-group trading within multinational
corporations?
h. Where does the company engage staff and how well, on average, do they
pay their staff in each jurisdiction in which they work?
i. Where does a multinational corporation exploit natural resources, and to
what extent?
j. By implication, and based on analysis of the foregoing data:
What is the risk of there being serious transfer mispricing within
the group?
If the level of activity and proﬁt vary widely within the group does this
suggest a high risk of tax enquiry at potential cost to future earnings?
Is the multinational corporation a big user of tax havens, and if so what is
the likely scale of the risk that results?
What is the geopolitical risk within a multinational corporation and is
that exacerbated by low tax payments?
What degree of risk does a company face if its operations in any country
were to close?
Is the company’s employment policy universally fair and if not what risk
does that imply?
Is the company’s activity sustainable?
These questions, and many others, cannot be answered on the basis of
ﬁnancial statements prepared under International Financial Reporting Stand-
ard. This was the motivation for creating country-by-country reporting. These
questions, the answers to which are vital for tax purposes but also for the
effective operation of capital markets and for nationally based economic risk
assessment, are clearly signiﬁcant and yet they are ignored by the IASB and the
other accounting standards setters.
This omission arises because, according to the IASB, the main purpose for
the accounts produced using its International Financial Reporting Standard
(IFRS) is to provide potential investors, lenders and other creditors of a
company with the information they need to make decisions about buying,
selling or holding equity or debt instruments issued by it or on providing or
settling loans or other forms of credit with it (Deloitte, 2010).
This is an extraordinarily narrow view of accounting and accountability,
which fails even on its own terms. It is made all the narrower by the fact that
they are aware that “other parties, including prudential and market regulators,
may ﬁnd general purpose ﬁnancial reports useful. However, the Board con-
sidered that the objectives of general purpose ﬁnancial reporting and the
objectives of ﬁnancial regulation may not be consistent. Hence, regulators
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are not considered a primary user and general purpose ﬁnancial reports are
not primarily directed to regulators or other parties.”
As a result the IASB notes “that general purpose ﬁnancial reports cannot
provide all the information that users may need to make economic decisions.
They will need to consider pertinent information from other sources as well.”
What they do not go on to say is what that other data that they chose that
accounts produced using their standards do not supply might be, or how it
might be obtained. Country-by-country reporting explicitly seeks to ﬁll that
gap, not least with regard to tax authorities.
3.3.4 The Data Supplied by Country-by-country Reporting
Country-by-country reporting would require disclosure of the following
information by each multinational corporation in its annual ﬁnancial
statements:
1. The name of each country in which it operates; a country for these
purposes being deﬁned as any jurisdiction in which it has a permanent
establishment for taxation purposes.
2. The names of all its companies trading in each country in which it
operates.
3. What its ﬁnancial performance is in every country in which it operates,
without exception, including:
3.1 Its sales, both third party and with other group companies
3.2 Its hedging transactions, both third party and intra-group
3.3 Purchases, split between third parties and intra-group transactions
3.4 Labour costs and employee numbers
3.5 Financing costs split between those paid to third parties and to other
group members
3.6 Its pre-tax proﬁt
3.7 The tax charge included in its accounts for the country in question
split as noted in more detail below
3.8 Details of the cost and net book value of its physical ﬁxed assets
located in each country including the cost of all investments (in-
cluding those relating to exploration) made in assets related to
extractive industries activity by location and the proceeds of sale
from disposals of such assets by location
3.9 Details of gross and net assets in total for each country in which the
entity operates. Note that if sales data on source and destination
bases for a jurisdiction are more than 10 percent different both must
be disclosed on both bases for both third parties and intra-group
transactions.
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4. Tax information would need to be analyzed by country in more depth
requiring disclosure of the following for each country in which the
corporation operates:
4.1 The tax charge for the year split between current and deferred tax
4.2 The actual tax payments made to the government of the country in
the period
4.3 The liabilities (and assets, if relevant) owing for tax and equivalent
charges at the beginning and end of each accounting period
4.4 Deferred taxation liabilities for the country at the start and close of
each accounting period.
5. Separate accounting, distinct from the turnover category, for all futures,
derivative, and forward contract sales with separate disclosure of pur-
chases of similar ﬁnancial instruments being disclosed with netting off
not allowed.
6. Cumulative disclosure on a year-by-year and country-by-country
basis of:
6.1 Provisions made for taxes from the time that country-by-country
reporting commenced
6.2 Total tax payments made from the time that country-by-country
reporting commenced.
There are additional requirements for companies operating in the extractive
industries.
Vitally, this data is expected to reconcile with the audited group consoli-
dated accounts and a statement proving that it does so would be a necessary
part of country-by-country reporting. As such country-by-country reporting
is not an alternative set of accounts for tax or other purposes: it holds the
company to account for what it does and requires it to declare where that
activity has arisen or is at least recorded (the two not necessarily being the
same thing).
3.3.5 The Beneﬁts of Country-by-country Reporting
The disclosure provided by country-by-country reporting would meet the
needs of many users of the ﬁnancial statement of multinational corporations
that accounts prepared under International Financial Reporting Standard,
which they currently rely on, cannot. Space available here does not, however,
allow many of those beneﬁts to be discussed. Instead we will focus on the issue
that ﬁrst prompted the idea: tackling international transfer mispricing by
multinational corporations.
Country-by-country is designed to offer access to new data for tax author-
ities anxious to ensure that the subsidiary companies of multinational
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corporations are tax compliant when operating within their jurisdictions. Tax
compliance in this context is deﬁned as seeking to pay the right amount of tax
(but no more) in the right place at the right time, where right means that the
economic substance of the transactions undertaken coincides with the place
and form in which they are reported for taxation purposes.
The ﬁrst, and perhaps most important use of country-by-country reporting
by tax authorities would be in undertaking risk assessments on the corporate
tax returns they receive to determine which ones they wish to investigate. All
tax authorities have limited resources at their command and these have,
therefore, to be used to greatest effect if tax abuse is to be tackled effectively.
Country-by-country reporting data lets any tax authority better and more
cost- effectively assess the risk that the constituent members of a multinational
corporation trading in its jurisdiction are avoiding tax. This could best be done
by applying a unitary apportionment formula to the group accounting data
reported by country that is disclosed in the multinational corporation’s ﬁnan-
cial statements. This does not require that unitary taxation be in operation;
this is a risk assessment tool whether or not it is in use. Such an apportionment
approach seeks to locate proﬁt in the places where it is likely to have arisen on
the basis of what are called “key allocation drivers,” which are discussed in
more detail below.
This risk assessment process is not possible at present. The country data
that a multinational corporation reports at present need not be prepared
consistently from state to state since different accounting standards can be
applied in each whilst if a “bottom up” approach is adopted intra-group proﬁts
may be apportioned inappropriately whilst group adjustment journals that are
used to ensure that the overall group result that is reported is true and fair may
be ignored, again distorting any such analysis. Country-by-country reporting
has been designed to overcome these problems and to make such apportion-
ment analysis for risk assessment purposes possible. Indeed, for tax authorities
this contribution to the cost effectiveness of their risk assessment process is the
way in which country-by-country reporting can almost certainly deliver the
greatest added value in tackling international tax abuse, by identifying which
companies might be undertaking that abuse, and where. This enables tax
authorities to direct scarce resources to best effect.
This approach implicitly accepts the principles behind unitary taxation even
if that system is not then used to assess the resulting proﬁt. This point is
important: using a unitary taxation approach to tax risk assessment does not
require using unitary taxation to assess the resulting tax due. It is a tool to
assess the appropriateness of proﬁt allocation for tax purposes, just as arm’s
length pricing is a tool.
The techniques of unitary taxation have been widely used to allocate proﬁts
between companies operating in different states within the USA and have
therefore been tried and tested. No one pretends they are perfect. But they can
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provide powerful indicators of likely acceptable or unacceptable proﬁt alloca-
tions that can in turn guide the inquiries of national tax authorities.
Unitary apportionment allocates the total group proﬁt earned by a multi-
national corporation to locations on the basis of a formula. The classic formula
is called the Massachusetts apportionment and it allocates proﬁt on the basis
of a formula that gives equal weighting to third-party sales, employees and
physical ﬁxed assets made from or located in a jurisdiction. This approach is
discussed in more detail in chapter 4 of this book.
There is good reason for choosing these three “allocation keys” for deter-
mining whether or not the economic substance of the transactions undertaken
coincides with the place and form in which they are reported for taxation
purposes: companies cannot make proﬁt without sales and they cannot make
sales without employing people and physical assets, many of which will be
linked to the production process. Of course the choice is not always going to be
perfect and different methods and weights can be chosen if it is considered
desirable for different commercial sectors. But the point is that if chosen with
care such a method should indicate within reasonable boundaries of probabil-
ity (which is the appropriate measure for a risk assessment tool) of whether or
not proﬁt is being recorded where it is most likely to be earned. It was this
thinking that led to the requirement that employee and ﬁxed asset information
to be disclosed under country-by-country reporting.
Using such a formula apportionment method has the advantage of meaning
that artiﬁcial reallocations of activity within a group (through intra-company
trading, debt and intellectual property charges, for example) can be largely
eliminated from consideration when deciding what the likely real location of
the proﬁt arising within a group might be. This is especially so if third party
sales are stated net of intra-group purchases to negate their artiﬁcial realloca-
tion, which is why data on intra-group transactions within country-by-country
reporting is essential in any such accounting system.
Importantly, the issues that this risk assessment method would address are
also those activities that are, unsurprisingly, those where the greatest difﬁculty
arises with arm’s length transfer pricing (see chapter XX of this book for more
information on this issue). The result is that the objectives of fair proﬁt
allocation reﬂecting underlying economic substance, that the “arms length
principle” of transfer pricing that the OECD promotes as the ideal solution to
solving transfer pricing disputes, can be replicated and improved upon, using a
unitary apportionment calculation based on country-by-country reporting
data but with much less effort and so cost than is the case under the
OECD’s chosen bilateral approach, which can in any event lead to more
than or less than the whole of a group’s proﬁt being taxed.
Three consequences would follow from this.
First, companies could themselves present this data to all authorities with
whom they engage to show that their proﬁt allocations are reasonable. If
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linked to “safe harbour” provisions suggesting degrees of tolerance on alloca-
tion, especially with regard to proﬁt attributed to low-risk states, such an
approach could be used to signiﬁcantly reduce the degree of transfer pricing
documentation required in compliant organizations. This would save them
and tax authorities considerable cost, while at the same time adding substan-
tial certainty to their tax affairs. It is hard to see why major multinational
corporations would not welcome this.
Second, all tax authorities would know that they were all receiving the same
data from a multinational corporation at the same time; the doubt that quite
reasonably exists at present that tax authorities are themselves subject to
arbitrage by multinational corporations would be eliminated. This would
also beneﬁt companies because what they could make clear is that they were
declaring all their taxable proﬁts once, and once only, to all relevant tax
authorities.
Third, it would be easier to resolve disputes since the impact of any
adjustment would be more readily apparent if country-by-country reporting
data were to be supplied to tax authorities. Again, the risk of double taxation
would be reduced as a result.
The consequence of these advantages is obvious: one of business’ key
objectives with regard to international taxation—the elimination of double
taxation—is bound to be easier to achieve if country-by-country reporting is
in place, whilst the goal of tax authorities—the elimination of double non-
taxation—will also be easier to facilitate. The inevitable consequence is a more
equitable and easier-to-resolve tax system. Moreover, given the considerable
savings that could be achieved for a multinational corporation that seeks to be
compliant in its tax allocation if its obligation to prepare the onerous docu-
mentation that arm’s length pricing currently requires was waived, the overall
burden on business would be reduced as a result. Even ignoring the other
beneﬁts for a great many stakeholders,5 the case for country-by-country
reporting for tax purposes is compelling on this basis.
3 .4 OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION AND
CREATING A COALITION OF THE WILLING
Whilst the case for country-by-country reporting may be compelling to its
advocates, and progress towards delivering it has been extraordinary in the
decade since it was ﬁrst proposed, there are obstacles to its implementation. As
Reuters (Bergin, 2013) reported in October 2013 when considering submissions
5 Elaborated at length in Murphy (2012).
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on the subject to the OECD as part of its transfer pricing documentation review
that in turn forms part of its Base Erosion and Proﬁts Shifting project:
Business groups were cool on a proposal tabled in June by the Group of Eight
(G8) leading developed economies, that companies should provide information
to tax authorities on their earnings and tax payments on a country-by-
country basis.
The idea was that greater transparency would help tax authorities—especially
those in developing nations which lack the investigative resources of richer
nations—to spot when companies were shifting proﬁts out of their countries,
and thereby avoiding taxes.
But business groups including Britain’s Confederation of British Industry, the
United States Council for International Business (USCIB) and French employers’
body Medef, expressed concerns that business would face unreasonable admin-
istrative burdens and risked having conﬁdential commercial information leak out
to competitors.
“Because of these concerns, we suggest that the OECD ought to consider
alternatives to country-by-country reporting,” wrote William Sample, chairman
of the tax committee at USCIB, whose members include Microsoft and Exxon
Mobil Corp.
In saying this they reﬂect the concern expressed by Big Four accountancy ﬁrm
Ernst & Young who in 2013 wrote in a report entitled “Tax Transparency:
Seizing the Initiative” (Ernst & Young, 2013):
In making the decision in terms of what to disclose, the range of information that
can fall under the ‘tax transparency’ banner is broad. One approach is country by
country reporting of tax payments, an approach creating concern for some
organisations. In its raw form, it is seen by many as complex, burdensome and
still not necessarily the panacea to improved transparency. For example, country
by country reporting does not directly inform stakeholders about whether an
organisation has or has not adopted aggressive tax positions, albeit positions that
are within the letter of the tax law.
Still, as a recognised reporting concept, adopted by the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative, the inﬂuence of country by country reporting has
begun to extend and it is now supported by the EU and set to become a
requirement for banking as well as extractive entities. Country by country
reporting has also been proposed at a territory, rather than sector, level by
the Australian Treasury.
The ﬂoodgates are, however, not yet open. Any further regulatory develop-
ments, in the EU at least, will take a number of years. This suggests that the
development by organisations of alternative tax transparent reporting approaches
such as increased narrative disclosure and more informative rate reconciliations
may yet stem the tide on country by country reporting. Alternatively, voluntary
adoption of a more reﬁned version of country by country reporting may allow
organisations to create a balanced, workable framework that meets the concerns
of stakeholders.
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The source of the opposition to country-by-country reporting is clear: it comes
from big business and its advisers. Their anxiety on the issue is apparent, as is
its source. They do not want, at any cost, to disclose what they actually do and
where, precisely what country-by-country reporting would require. Global
companies fear being held to account locally.
They therefore seek to avoid country-by-country reporting in a number of
ways. They say they do not have the data to prepare country-by-country
reporting or that it would be too expensive or onerous to prepare the data.
Most commonly they argue that the data produced by country-by-country
reporting would simply not be useful.
Some of these claims are just nonsense. If, for example, a multinational
corporation does not know where its transactions are located it cannot
accurately determine its tax liabilities. As such it is failing to both maintain
proper books and records of account as required by the law of almost all
countries and proper internal control systems as required, for example, by
Sarbane Oxley. Similarly the argument that this data will be hard to audit is
just wrong: it may increase audit cost because auditors might have to consider
the accounts they review in more depth but it is hard to say that this does not
provide beneﬁt to shareholders whose risk is reduced as a result.
Perhaps the most absurd argument though is the one most often put
forward, that country-by-country reporting data will simply not be useful,
which is resorted to by the management of multinational corporations when
all other arguments have failed. They seem in the process to be suggesting that:
a. Users of accounts will not understand country-by-country reporting
data, despite that fact that it will be presented in similar format to all
other ﬁnancial reporting.
b. There are no civil society users of accounts.
c. Tax authorities, regulators, and others never look at or comprehend
accounts.
d. Investors will not use data if it is made available to them but will instead
choose to ignore it when making their decisions.
None of these arguments is plausible. However, powerful and wealthy lobby
interests back these arguments. The OECD (2014) discussion paper on
country-by-country reporting, published in January 2014, was a disappoint-
ment to many campaigning for it. It is not clear from the report that the
OECD has even understood the basic principles on which country-by-country
reporting is based. For example, the OECD have asked whether country-by-
country reporting should be supplied by what is, in effect, simple republication
of local statutory accounting for the member companies of multinational
corporation rather than by attributing the activities recorded in the single,
consolidated set of ﬁnancial statements issued by the group as a whole to
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individual jurisdictions, which is what country-by-country reporting requires.
Some of the data they propose should be published, such as the tax actually paid
in a jurisdiction instead of the tax due within it, also makes almost no account-
ing sense. It is clear as a result that the argument for country-by-country
reporting has not yet been won despite the promising noises made in 2013.
That is disappointing; as has been argued here, country-by-country report-
ing data has considerable potential value in use. It is likely that when live data
is available very many more uses will be found. In that case this argument has
to be seen for what it is, which is a claim that management should be trusted
with the stewardship of assets without consequent accountability.
It is this last idea that offers the prospect for taking this idea forward. Three
major concerns have emerged since 2008 that suggest that the demand for full
country-by- country reporting could be the basis for a campaign attracting a
broad coalition of support.
The ﬁrst demand is for accountability: the unquestioning relationship of
trust with big business based on the assumption that all trade is good has been
shattered in the aftermath of the crash.
The second demand is for transparency: the idea that opacity left the
world’s economy unprepared for what hit it in 2008 is clear. David Cameron
made this a theme of his G8 summit in June 2013 (G8 Leaders, 2013).
The third concern is, of course, about tax, which issue was almost unheard
of by the public before 2008 but is now well and truly known.
Each of these concerns is manifested in a number of ways. The concern
about trade clearly has a focus on banking for some, especially in places like
the UK where this has lead to greater austerity than many countries. For
others, such as those in countries dominated by the extractive industries,
corruption is the concern. For others it is environmental concern that makes
them want to hold business to account. Consumers are worried about
unaccountable energy companies. A worry about massive social media con-
cerns who appear to be accountable nowhere motivates many. Some just want
to know who they are dealing with and that they are good citizens.
In each case there is a coincidence of aims. Politicians feel powerless in the
face of these enterprises and those they deal with feel helpless in the face of
leviathans. That is why the common aim of all who seek to make corporations
accountable is to link the global to the local. This helps ensure that tax is paid
in the right place at the right time. But it also means politicians can gauge what
they’re up against and supply chains can be appraised. This is a major concern
already and is likely to loom larger as global logistics are increasingly stressed
by climate change.
The reality is that no single lobby with these interests can win this reform by
itself and to date it is the tax case that has stimulated demand for country-by-
country reporting. That has delivered some results—and got business worried.
However, the tipping point will come when this demand reﬂects a coalition of
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interests. That means politicians have to see the gains, and not the threats. And
that will happen when the three biggest campaign aims in the world coalesce
around this demand. They are the development community, who have driven
this agenda to date, the environmental campaigning community, and those who
demand the resources to meet education and health needs, both of whom are
now seriously impacted by increasing private sector involvement worldwide.
One campaign lobby is powerful: three utterly persuasive. That means
country-by-country reporting will work when it delivers the accountability
and tax that means that trade is seen to be of beneﬁt and trust is restored in
global business. This is possible. One lobby has got us a long way. Making this
a concern for the environment, education, and health will deliver the desired
outcome.
And at that point something else will happen. As Schopenhauer argued,
truth goes through three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, it is ridiculed. In the second
stage, it is violently opposed. And in the third stage, it is accepted as self-
evident. Country-by-country reporting has got through the ridicule stage. It is
now facing serious opposition. With enough being persuaded of its merits the
time will come when a fourth lobby will embrace it as self-evidently useful, and
that is business itself. That may be a while off yet, but enlightened fund
managers may yet help trail a path in that direction.
We have not got country-by-country reporting yet. When we do, global
business will never look the same again. Rather than busying itself with tax
avoidance and the associated grand corruption it will be free to concentrate on
productive activity. The sector will be able to compete in good faith, free from
the suspicion that it is exploiting covert monopolies or subverting democratic
governments. If we could convince it that the outcome may be in its best
interests then real reform will happen, and that’s now within the boundaries of
possibility.
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